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Choose Health, Not War Drug Policy in Transition January 14, 1993 The Drug Policy Foundation Copyright 1993, by the Drug Policy Foundation. Any part of this publication may be reproduced without express permission from the Drug Policy Foundation, provided that appropriate credit is given. The Drug Policy Foundation is an independent forum for drug policy alternatives. It is the leading organization dedicated to research, education and public information related to the international war on drugs. It is not a legalization organization. though some of its members support such an alternative to current drug policies. Our support comes from across the political spectrum, helping demonstrate the middle-ground consensus that has evolved favoring health-oriented alternatives to the last decade's harsh law-enforcement-dominated drug war. This report represents another in a long series of educational efforts by the Foundation to spell out possible reforms to our national drug policies. The Foundation is a charitable corporation under the laws of the District of Columbia and section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. All contributions to the Foundation are tax-deductible. To maintain its independence, the Drug Policy Foundation neither seeks nor accepts government funding. It is supported by the contributions of private individuals and organizations. The Drug Policy Foundation 4455 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite B-500 Washington, D.C. 20008-2302 (202) 537-5005 Fax (202) 537-3007 President: Arnold S. Trebach Vice President: Kevin B. Zeese Director, Public Information: Kennington Wall Deputy Director, Public Information: Dave Fratello Assistant Director, Public Information: Rob Stewart Director of Marketing: Kendra E. Wright Contents Executive Summary..............................................l Drug Policy in Transition: An Opportunity to Choose Compassion and Effectiveness...................................3 The Law Enforcement Solution Has Been an Expensive Failure.....3 Public Health Policies Offer the Best Hope for the Future......5 Change the Tone of Drug Policy from One of Intolerance and Hate to One of Acceptance and Assistance...................5 Put Public Health Officials in Charge of Drug Control..........7 A Public Health Approach is Politically Popular................7 Appoint a National Commission to Plan Drug Policy for the 21st Century........................................................9 Redefining Drug Enforcement....................................11 Mandatory Minimums Distort Justice ............................12 Curtail Abuses of the Drug Enforcement Bureaucracy.............14 Eliminate Duplication in the Drug Enforcement Agencies.........15 Integrate Law Enforcement into Public Health Controls..........16 Developing Public Health Strategies............................19 Make Treatment on Demand a Reality.............................19 Shift Budget Emphasis from Law Enforcement to Health-Based Solutions .....................................................20 Make AIDS the Top Priority in Drug Control - Support Needle Exchanges and Medical Marijuana................................21 De-militarizing the Drug War Abroad............................25 Eradication and Interdiction Have Failed.......................25 Human Rights and International Law Have Deteriorated...........26 The United States Wastes Billions on the International Drug War.........................................27 Endnotes.......................................................29 Executive Summary President Clinton has the opportunity to choose compassionate and effective drug control strategies. With record murder rates, increases in drug purity and decreases in price, the law-enforcement-dominated policy of the past has been an expensive failure. Ending the war on drugs does not mean ending the control of drugs. Public health strategies offer the best hope for the future. President Clinton can make significant progress by merely changing the tone of drug policy from one of intolerance and hate to one of acceptance and assistance. He can begin to allow development of pragmatic drug policies in the middle ground between a destructive drug war and outright drug legalization. In the immediate future, President Clinton should shift emphasis to public health controls by putting health officials in charge of drug control and directing them to seek practical solutions to drug-related problems. To develop a long-term drug control plan for the 21st century, a presidential commission should be appointed to take a fresh look at all drug control options. Movement away from law enforcement toward a public health strategy will not only be more effective, it will also be less expensive and politically popular with the American people. 1. Emphasize Public Health Strategies Rather than Law Enforcement Strategies * Shift the federal budget emphasis toward health-based programs including treatment on demand, health care for drug users (emphasizing AIDS, tuberculosis and prenatal care); and expand methadone maintenance, and develop new maintenance drugs. * Integrate law enforcement programs into health strategies. * At the federal level, funding should be provided for prison-based drug treatment and rehabilitation programs as well as programs for people arrested for drug offenses. Stop abuses of drug enforcement, including kidnapping of foreign nationals, using the military against US citizens, abusing forfeiture laws and overusing harsh mandatory sentences. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 1 * At the state and local level, the federal government should support intensive supervised probation for drug offenders, joint community outreach programs by police and health officials, treatment as an alternative to prosecution, and prison-based treatment programs. * Make AIDS prevention a top priority in drug control by easing access to sterile syringes, funding needle exchange programs as well as other outreach programs to injecting drug users. * Get the police out of medical practice; recognize the medical utility of marijuana; de-emphasize prosecution of doctors; and encourage research on Schedule I drugs. 2. Eliminate Duplication in the Drug Enforcement Agencies * Move drug czar's office to the Department of Health and Human Services; reduce the size of its staff and budget; and put HHS in charge of drug control. * Eliminate DEA; move its responsibilities to FBI, FDA and State Department. * Take the Defense Department out of drug control; use the Coast Guard and Customs Service for scaled-down interdiction and eradication activities. 3. Recognize the Ineffectiveness of Militarized Interdiction and Eradication Programs * Reverse anti-drug funding priorities in Latin America; do not make the drug war a higher priority than stopping abuses of human rights; and stop pressuring Latin American countries to adopt the US drug war. 4. Develop a Drug Control Plan for the 21st Century * Appoint a presidential commission to develop public health strategies; integrate drug treatment into national health care and examine basic questions about whether prohibition or legal controls are more effective. 2 The Drug Policy Foundation Drug Policy in Transition: An Opportunity to Choose Compassion and Effectiveness During the first presidential debate on Oct. 11, 1992, President-elect Clinton defined "insanity" as "doing the same old thing over and over again and expecting a different result." For most of this century, and with particular intensity over the last 12 years, the United States has pursued a law enforcement dominated drug control strategy. However, America is no closer to eliminating drug abuse. In fact, today there is more drug trade violence and drug-related disease, and tens of millions of Americans violate the drug laws every year. President Bill Clinton is faced with a historic opportunity. He can choose one of two paths - the continuation of the current law enforcement dominated strategy or pragmatic compromises that would minimize the harms caused by drug abuse to society, as well as to the individual user. Only the latter offers the hope that this nation and much of the world will finally start to deal more compassionately and effectively with the agonizing problems of drug abuse and the related problems of disease and crime. In addition to being the more effective policy, pragmatic compromises have also become politically palatable to the American public and drug policy experts from many backgrounds. The Law Enforcement Solution Has Been an Expensive Failure The law enforcement solution has created a martial atmosphere resulting in record drug arrests and imprisonments (1) all in the name of controlling drugs. In addition, the law enforcement approach has allowed diseases - particularly AIDS and tuberculosis - to spread rapidly among drug using populations. At the same time, violent crime has reached record levels and the most hazardous forms of drug abuse have not been significantly reduced.(2) While the drug war has waxed and waned for most of this century, it reached new heights during the Reagan-Bush era. One measurement of the heights of the drug war is its direct monetary cost. President Reagan Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 3 Crime Rate Rises with Prison Population Rate Figure 1, (1) dramatically increased the pace of the drug war when he came into office in January 1981 and managed to spend $22.3 billion on drug control during eight years. Mr. Bush escalated spending to $45.2 billion out of federal coffers during four years, making him the biggest drug-war spender in our history.(3) If this pace of increased spending continues, Mr. Clinton could easily spend $70 billion during his first term in office on drug control. Assuming that the states follow the federal lead and match Washington roughly dollar for dollar as they have been doing, then direct governmental outlays for the drug war could reach $140 billion over the next four years. More Spending Has Not Slowed the Killings Figure 2, (2) 4 The Drug Policy Foundation The treasure devoted to the current drug war has failed to buy a safer or healthier society. In addition to increasing the tax burden on all Americans in the short term, it ensures a greater long-term financial burden. The country currently spends $20 billion annually to incarcerate 1.2 million Americans.(4) Since most drug offenses involve mandatory sentences with no parole, this ensures a prison population approaching 2 million by 1996 and costing $40 billion a year to maintain. The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that by 1996 two-thirds of all federal prisoners will be drug offenders. In addition, the uncompromising drug war approach ensures the spread of disease. During the 1980s intravenous drug use became the source of one-third of all AIDS cases because drug policy-makers refused to allow pragmatic policies to curtail the spread of the disease. Adopting AIDS prevention policies like needle exchanges will slow the spread of this illness, save lives and save money. All of these substantive and political facts should force consideration of a reformed drug policy. Public Health Policies Offer the Best Hope for the Future In the best pragmatic traditions that have held the Republic together, a reformed drug policy will involve a series of compromises between legalization and a harsh war on drugs. Its major themes would be health-based policies that seek to reduce drug-related harms. Under this approach, the criminal prohibition laws that make certain drugs illegal would for the most part stay in place. However, the tone and emphasis of drug policy would change and local governments would be encouraged to develop practical solutions to drug-related problems in their communities. Change the Tone of Drug Policy from One of Intolerance and Hate to One of Acceptance and Assistance Perhaps the most effective step President Clinton could take is to apply his philosophy of inclusion of all Americans to drug policy and move away from the demagoguery and extremism that have dominated drug policy, particularly over the last 12 years. During the Reagan-Bush era, extremist rhetoric resulted in extremist policies. It did not matter that AIDS was spreading out of control among intravenous drug users. Policy-makers avoided consideration of policies to stop the spread of this epidemic because they were inconsistent with the philosophy of "zero tolerance." When President Bush first focused on drug policy, he scared the nation into submission with his infamous white lie. In his first televised address on Sept. 5, 1989, the president held up a bag of crack and stated that the "poison" was seized in Lafayette Park, across the street from the White House. The vision of drug dealers peddling their wares dangerously near the seat of government was firmly implanted. Mr. Bush did not tell the public that undercover agents lured the dealer to Lafayette Park, where there are no Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 5 drug dealers, to give the president the perfect photo opportunity. The unknowing player was a Washington, D.C., high school senior who needed directions from the undercover agents because he did not even know where the White House was. This national falsehood primed the engine for a rapid expansion of the drug war machine. The president's ability to lie on national television to achieve a "higher" objective gave other people the green light. Any drug user was fair game. William Bennett, the first director of national drug control policy, commented on national television that he had no ethical problem with beheading drug dealers. Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates said in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 5,1990, "The casual user ought to be taken out and shot...." The president's tone encouraged extremist rhetoric, which, in turn, allowed extremist policy. In this atmosphere of hatred, the United States became a nation that incarcerated more of its citizens than any other, ignored international law and kidnapped citizens of other countries. Changing the tone of drug policy merely means applying the tone of the Clinton-Gore campaign to the drug issue. When Candidate Clinton called for a "New Covenant" at the Democratic National Convention on July 16, 1992, he said: "It is time to heal America. And so we must say to every American: 'look beyond the stereotypes that blind us. We need each other. All of us, we need each other. We don't have a person to waste.'" He called for an end to divisiveness between "us and them." He called for government to bring people together - to be all-inclusive. We urge President Clinton to apply that philosophy to the tens of millions of Americans who use illicit drugs. Stop calling them the enemies in a domestic war and start calling them fellow citizens who, whatever their tastes or problems, are welcome and needed members of the American family. The move to pragmatic health-based policies away from failed law enforcement policies is consistent with the overall philosophy of the Clinton-Gore campaign. When Mr. Clinton announced his run for the presidency in Little Rock, Ark., on Oct. 3,1991, he promised: "A Clinton administration won't spend our money on programs that don't solve problems and a government that doesn't work. I want to reinvent government to make it more efficient and more effective." No government program has failed more dramatically than the war on drugs. When the drug war kept producing failure, the solution of Presidents Reagan and Bush was to spend more. Rather than re-evaluating the policy, they threw more money at it, resulting in massive waste. We urge President Clinton to let the reinventing begin. Rather than blindly pursuing the drug war, make components of the drug war justify themselves and look to alternative strategies that are more pragmatic and hold the promise of being more effective. 6 The Drug Policy Foundation Put Public Health Officials in Charge of Drug Control Doctors and educators should become the main directors of a public health drug policy. The Office of National Drug Control Policy should move to the Department of Health and Human Services, and its director should be experienced in drug control. Where health officials determine it essential, certain measures should be adopted even though they might involve deviation from the rigid drug-free rhetoric of the war on drugs. Such public health measures would operate on the assumption that it is impossible to make the society "drug free," but that it is possible to set up a series of practical steps that reduce the harm from drug use. Public health officials should focus on specific problems like the spread of AIDS, tuberculosis and violent crime. They should then adopt public health solutions to each problem rather than taking a broad-brush drug war approach. Law enforcement, which would be diminished but would continue to have a significant role, should be integrated into health policies as even violent crime has now been recognized as an issue with public health solutions.(5) Law enforcement should be guided by the principle expressed by President Jimmy Carter in 1977 to a joint session of Congress: enforcement of drug laws should not be more damaging to the individual than use of the drug itself. Because education and treatment are much less expensive than arrest and imprisonment, this is one of the few problem areas now facing the president where less is more. Thus, the more effective choice could save billions of taxpayer dollars. A Public Health Approach is Politically Popular In addition to being the more sensible policy option, the public health approach is also a politically popular approach that will gain in popularity as it is successfully implemented. We base this political judgment on a wide array of information, some anecdotal and some scientific. The Drug Policy Foundation is in a unique position to hear the opinions of citizens and experts throughout the country and the world on the drug issue. There never has been such high-level and lay support for major change in drug policy. The Foundation regularly receives letters and calls from conservative federal and state officials, especially judges, who declare that they are sick and tired of being part of a system that destroys the lives of petty offenders with barbaric sentences, while worsening the problems of drugs and crime worse. We are also frequently informed of events that symbolize this reformist trend in what may be termed unlikely circles. At a recent major conference of the National League of Cities, Minneapolis Deputy Chief of Police Dave DeBrotka declared, "I think we need to rethink the metaphor for dealing with drugs," and then went on to criticize the phrase "war on drugs." This critique was met by cheers from the plenary audience of 2,500 city officials. Chief Deputy DeBrotka explained that the new administration had to get away Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 7 from the tough, lock-em-up philosophy that now dominates the country. As a law enforcement agent he stated that they had to resist community pressures "to behave as if we are in a totalitarian society."(6) During the mid-1980s, such utterances by a high-ranking police officer might have been booed, but now American officials and voters are starting to realize that the war on drugs has been an expensive failure. Scientific evidence of the political feasibility of reform comes from a survey conducted under the auspices of the Foundation. A national survey of 1,401 Americans was carried out in early 1990 by Targeting Systems Inc. in a project funded by noted Chicago philanthropist and commodities broker Richard J. Dennis. According to the survey, 68 percent of Americans favor treatment and counseling for drug users while only 21 percent favor punishment. Also, 70 percent felt that the government has done too little to support drug education and treatment. Fully 74 percent opted for less expensive methods than imprisonment when asked about the cost factor in drug control. They said that they preferred that more of their tax dollars be allocated to education and treatment rather than to imprisonment of drug users. The highest pro-medicalization response followed the question as to whether or not physicians should be allowed to prescribe heroin for pain; 76 percent said yes. On a similar question about prescribing marijuana in medicine, 69 percent responded in the affirmative.(7) On the question of providing sterile needles to prevent the spread of AIDS, the answers were equally divided: 47 percent for and against, with 6 percent not responding. However, since the survey was conducted, the evidence on the effectiveness of needle exchanges has mounted as well as the support for needle exchanges. A more current survey would show majority support for this key strategy to curb the spread of AIDS. It is also worth noting that 36 percent of the sample went so far as to support outright repeal of many drug laws. Thus, advocates of drug decriminalization or legalization remained a minority in 1990, but were a significant and growing minority, far bigger than anyone had previously thought. During the Reagan-Bush era the drug policy debate was polarized between proponents of legalization and proponents of the drug war. One effect of this polarization was to avoid discussion of the broad range of middle ground policies that are available. However, due to policy changes in Europe and projects of local governments in the United States, a consensus of support for harm reduction strategies has developed among drug policy professionals. This includes proponents of decriminalization models as well as prohibition models.(8) Thus, President Clinton has a historic opportunity to lead the nation toward a pragmatic drug policy that has the support not only of drug policy experts, but also of the American people. 8 The Drug Policy Foundation Appoint a National Commission to Plan Drug Policy for the 21st Century This report recommends short-term steps that could be taken to begin to move drug policy toward a public health strategy. However, no matter what policy is chosen, drug use will be with us forever. Human beings have always used intoxicating substances and will continue to do so. The United States should begin to plan now for a long-term policy to control drug abuse. This should include alcohol and tobacco use, which has been much ignored by the federal government. While these two drugs are legal they present a variety of policy issues and problems for American society. President Clinton should follow the advice of Baltimore Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke and create a blue-ribbon commission that will analyze the drug problem and offer policy changes. Legal, medical and academic experts who are willing to take a fresh look at the problem should serve on this commission. The commission should tackle the following short-range issues: adapting public health strategies to drug-related problems (including both legal and illegal drugs); including drug treatment in the national health plan; and changing law enforcement's role in drug control. The commission should also develop a long-range drug control strategy for the 21st century. This should include answering the critical questions of whether or not prohibition policies are counterproductive to drug control and whether or not there are alternatives to prohibition that could be more effective. This country needs a forum for a rational discussion of an issue that has been used for political grandstanding. In the spirit of the economic summit in Little Rock, the new president should open the commission's initial proceedings with a public hearing. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 9 Summary: Redefining Drug Enforcement 1. Use Criminal Justice Funding for Public Health Strategies * At the federal level, shift funding from law enforcement to health-based solutions. Make enforcement efforts consistent with health controls by increasing funding for treatment and rehabilitation in prisons as well as for individuals arrested for drug offenses. Allow offenders who complete treatment and rehabilitation programs to have their sentences reduced. * At the state and local level, support: pilot programs for intensive supervised probation where a probation officer has no more than 20 probationers rather than 75 or 100 (which is currently common in many jurisdictions); programs that bring local police and health officials together in community outreach to drug abusers; programs that provide for treatment as an alternative to prosecution; and programs for prison-based treatment projects. 2. Eliminate Duplication in the Drug Enforcement Agencies * Move the drug czar's office to the Department of Health and Human Services, reduce its size and put health officials in charge of enforcement efforts. * Eliminate Drug Enforcement Administration, move its responsibilities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Food and Drug Administration and the State Department. * Take the Defense Department out of the drug war, and use the Coast Guard and Customs Service in a scaled-down interdiction program. 3. Curtail Abuses of Drug Enforcement Bureaucracy * Modify mandatory minimum penalties to give judges flexibility * Stop the misuse of civil forfeiture laws * Stop using the military against U.S. citizens * Stop kidnapping of foreign nationals * Stop the erosion of the attorney-client relationship 10 The Drug Policy Foundation Redefining Drug Enforcement The criminal justice approach to the drug problem looks good on paper. Cut the supply of drugs to drive up the price to the consumer, thereby discouraging consumption. Jack up the penalties until people get the message that drugs are bad. Arrest dealers to clean up the streets. Unfortunately, the United States is no closer to winning the drug war today than it was four years ago, 12 years ago or 20 years ago. During the Bush administration, over 1 million Americans were arrested each year for drug violations, over 1.2 million Americans lived behind bars each year, and record amounts of drugs were seized. According to the criminal enforcement theory, we should have turned the corner. However, even with the highest levels of incarceration in the Western world,(9) things got worse. Hard-core drug abuse increased, while occasional use remained stable. Drug importation rose, causing a drop in price and an increase in purity. Violent crime, particularly homicides, reached record levels. The Reagan-Bush drug war, with its record levels of spending on police, prosecutors, prisons and interdiction, proved that no amount of law enforcement can solve the drug problem. Presidents Reagan and Bush incorrectly assumed that law enforcement officials could eliminate a problem that has roots in social and health concerns. Inadequate housing, unemployment and underemployment, and the breakdown of the family led to despair, leading to drug abuse, among other problems. The Congress deserves some of the blame for the pursuit of this failed drug strategy. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has led the charge. He has played politics with the crime issue, trying to position the Democrats as "tough on crime." In each election year since 1984, the Democrats passed harsh crime bills. This may have served political ends, but certainly did not serve any practical purpose - as evidenced by the worsening violent crime and drug problems during the decade. Continuing to play politics with a failed tough-on-crime strategy will no longer provide political benefits as the public will see it for what it is. It is time to stop playing politics with this issue and get practical. The United States needs to move toward public health approaches to drug abuse. This will require less reliance on law enforcement, and the constructive use of Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 11 law enforcement as part of a public health strategy. Rather than spending more money on more police, the government should focus on preventing and treating drug abuse; rather than spending money on constructing prisons, we should be building health care facilities. Mandatory Minimums Distort Justice Mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenders is the centerpiece of this failed strategy. Mandatory sentencing has created a tremendously overburdened prison system that has become very expensive to operate and needs continual expansion to meet capacity. In 1991, the federal Bureau of Prisons estimated that prison construction costs nationwide would soon approach $100 million per week and that total Average Sentences for Violent & Drug Offenses Figure 3, (12) prison-related fiscal obligations could be almost double the current national deficit within five years. Steps must be taken now to begin to relieve this pressing burden. One step that should be taken is to repeal mandatory sentencing statutes. Mandatory minimums have been opposed by every federal judicial circuit that handles drug cases plus the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Federal Courts Study Commission. (Sadly, Congress has ignored these top-level judicial commissions.) Mandatory sentencing statutes demonstrate that society does not trust the decision-making ability of judges. Currently, judges cannot take into consideration the personal background of a defendant, e.g., whether a defendant has left the drug trade, completed drug treatment or gotten a legitimate job prior to being sentenced. The only factor is the weight of the drug involved. Thus, whether an individual is a peripheral participant or a drug kingpin makes no difference; whether the person obstructed justice or accepted responsibility makes no difference. As a result, defendants in markedly different situations and backgrounds can receive the same sentence. Mandatory sentencing has moved discretion from the open courtroom to the back rooms of the prosecutor's office where decisions are made about how an offender will be charged. This has resulted in significant racial 12 The Drug Policy Foundation disparities. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, defendants plead to lesser charges in 35 percent of the cases that initially warranted a mandatory sentence. The Sentencing Commission found that mandatory sentences were more likely to be used against African-American defendants than white defendants; 67.7 percent of blacks received sentences at or above the mandatory minimum, while 54 percent of whites received such sentences.(10) However, since charging and plea negotiation are not open to public review nor generally reviewable by the courts, it is impossible to determine why this racial disparity exists. Mandatory sentencing statutes create disparity based on the amount of drug involved by creating what the Sentencing Commission calls "cliffs." For example, current law mandates a minimum five-year term of imprisonment for a defendant convicted of first-offense, simple possession of 5.01 grams of crack (about a teaspoon full). However, a first offender convicted of simple possession of 5.0 grams of crack is subject to a maximum sentence of one year.(11,12) There are two ways to reform mandatory sentencing to weave judicial discretion into sentencing, even if no move is made now to repeal mandatory minimums. First, prosecutors and judges should be given the authority to go below the mandatory sentence if the individual successfully completes drug treatment or other rehabilitation programs prior to being convicted. Second, legislation should be passed that allows a judge to consider reducing the sentences of prisoners who successfully complete treatment and rehabilitation programs while incarcerated. Currently, a federal prisoner gets no benefit for completing rehabilitation while incarcerated. The mandatory sentence remains the same whether the person does nothing to prepare for life after incarceration or works hard to improve. Legislation should be enacted encouraging rehabilitation by making it available and by rewarding inmates who complete such programs. Without such changes, we will merely continue to warehouse people. Moreover, the Clinton administration can instruct U.S. attorneys to encourage rehabilitation by requiring prosecutors to seek sentences below the mandatory minimum for individuals who seek help after their arrest. Prosecutors can do this by charging defendants without mentioning a specific amount of drugs in the indictment. In this way, the administration can begin to relieve the burden of prison overcrowding and can begin to encourage treatment and rehabilitation. Finally, with regard to mandatory minimum sentencing, the Clinton administration should take a fresh look at the 1992 crime bill vetoed by President Bush. Even though criminal justice professionals at every level oppose mandatory sentencing, that bill contained a record number of new mandatory sentencing statutes. Now that the election is over, the Democrats should stop playing crass politics with the crime issue and seriously reconsider crime control strategies. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 13 Curtail Abuses of the Drug Enforcement Bureaucracy In addition to weaving drug enforcement into a public health strategy, the Clinton administration needs to curtail some of the abuses that have arisen during the last decade of aggressive law enforcement. * Stop the Use of Civil Forfeiture Laws. Current federal law allows the forfeiture of property prior to a criminal conviction based on a mere showing of probable cause. The funds seized go back into law enforcement activities. Thus, police officials are encouraged to seize more assets. This has resulted in individuals having all their property and assets seized without ever being charged with a criminal offense and individuals having property seized prior to prosecution, making them unable to afford an attorney. Legislation should be sought to prevent these abuses. Such legislation should not allow forfeiture prior to conviction and should channel forfeited funds to the U.S. Treasury, not to law enforcement agencies that stand to profit from asset forfeitures. In the meantime, President Clinton should instruct U.S. attorneys to use criminal forfeiture authority instead of civil forfeiture. * Stop Using the Military against U.S. Citizens. The Bush administration broke a barrier in law enforcement that has existed since the founding of our republic - they used active duty military troops against U.S. citizens. Traditionally, the U.S. military has not had a role in domestic law enforcement. However, the Bush administration used some of the same troops it used to invade Panama to invade Northern California in search of marijuana gardens and to participate in the arrest of people allegedly growing them. A lawsuit is currently pending against such action.(13) District Judge Fern Smith, in ruling against the government's motion to dismiss, found that, if the military was so used, it was done illegally. The Clinton administration should enter into a consent agreement in this suit agreeing not to use military troops domestically against U.S. citizens. * Stop the Kidnapping of Foreign Nationals. The United States has disgraced itself in the eyes of the world community by ignoring the sovereignty of other nations and going into foreign countries to kidnap their citizens. Requests for extradition of U.S. citizens who are accused of past kidnappings should be granted. The Clinton administration should issue an order saying that it will abide by international treaties and seek extradition of foreign nationals rather than unilaterally kidnapping citizens of other countries. * Stop the Erosion of the Attorney-Client Relationship. During the Reagan-Bush era, tremendous pressure was put on the constitutional right to counsel in drug prosecutions. While funding increased for prosecution of drug offenses, the Criminal Justice Act, which funds appointed counsel, received insufficient funding. Private defense attorneys who handled drug cases were faced with a variety of pressures, including subpoenas forcing them to testify against their clients, threatened seizures of their legal fees and requirements to report confidential fee information to the IRS. The 14 The Drug Policy Foundation Clinton administration should use these law enforcement tools very carefully and instruct U.S. attorneys' offices to honor Sixth Amendment guarantees. Eliminate Duplication in the Drug Enforcement Agencies As part of the increased emphasis on public health solutions to drug-related problems, the Office of National Drug Control Policy should be moved to the Department of Health and Human Services.(14) The National Drug Control Policy Director should be given the authority to ensure that law enforcement aspects of drug control are consistent with public health strategies. The reason for having a drug czar has been called into question. Outgoing Attorney General William Barr commented recently that because the drug czar's office does not have any executive authority to implement any programs, it cannot actually coordinate and direct the federal anti-drug effort.(15) In spite of its limitations, the drug czar's office mushroomed during the last four years. In 1989, the ONDCP was a White House office with a budget of $3.5 million; by 1992, it grew to 110 employees and spent $126.7 million.(16) The ONDCP has a history of political cronyism. Almost half of all ONDCP Budget Figure 4, (16) ONDCP personnel are political appointees, a luxury no other executive branch office enjoys. The latest director, former Florida Gov. Bob Martinez, was a Bush campaign fund-raiser who ascended to drug czar after losing reelection. No one thought of him as having any drug policy experience, except for the fact that South Florida became a cocaine trafficking hub during his gubernatorial administration. Under Bob Martinez, the ONDCP looked more like an extension of the Bush campaign than it did a drug policy office. The drug czar admitted he improperly used office stationery to collect money owed to him by television stations, which he then donated to the Republican Party for the Bush reelection effort.(16.1) Martinez worked to rally the Republican faithful to the Bush cause in 1992. Alarmed at the political course the drug policy office was taking, Congress passed legislation to bar ONDCP personnel from political campaigning. The new drug policy director should be someone with experience in drug policy, not political campaigning. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 15 DEA Budget Authority, 1981-1993 Figure 5, (17) The Drug Policy Foundation urges President Clinton to close down the Drug Enforcement Administration (17) and move the domestic activities of the DEA over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DEA's international activities should be moved to the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters at the State Department. Its activities related to prescription drugs should be moved to the Food and Drug Administration. Disbanding the DEA may seem controversial, but the proposal enjoys the support of high-ranking Justice Department officials. During his confirmation hearings, FBI Director William S. Sessions said the idea deserved serious consideration.(18) In addition, the Foundation recommends removing the Defense Department from the drug war. Law enforcement is better suited to agencies like the FBI, Coast Guard and Customs Service than it is to the blunt instrument of the military. (See pages 24-28.) One of the problems in drug control efforts has been competition and duplication of efforts among the many agencies involved. There have been consistent reports of multiple agencies claiming responsibility for the same seizures as well as fights between agencies over confiscated property. Taking the DEA and the Defense Department out of the picture will resolve many of these problems and will result in significant savings for the federal budget. If President Clinton makes all of these streamlining moves, the federal government would save close to $2 billion annually. Integrate Law Enforcement into Public Health Controls As part of the gradually increased emphasis on health-based policies, law enforcement programs should be tied into prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. This can be done for individuals who have been arrested for drug offenses, as well as for those convicted. In addition, police can play a positive role in allowing needle exchanges and prevention programs to develop. 16 The Drug Policy Foundation The first step in weaving criminal justice into the health strategy is to use criminal justice funding for public health strategies. Currently, the federal government grants 10 times more money to state and local law enforcement programs than it does to state and local treatment programs. This discrepancy should be changed. In addition, law enforcement funding should be used to encourage pilot projects that move law enforcement closer to a public health-based drug policy. State and local programs supported by the federal government should include: * Intensive, supervised probation programs where a probation officer has no more than 20 probationers rather than 75 or 100 (which is currently common in many jurisdictions). These intensive probation programs should also include funding for employment training, education and social services for offenders. * Pilot programs that bring local police and health officials together in community outreach The message from the police should be that arrests are not their goal, instead they want to protect the health and safety of the community, including the health of drug users. Therefore, as they have in New Haven and other cities, police would be supporting needle exchange programs and working closely with treatment and rehabilitation programs. These programs should be conducted in urban areas where recent reports indicate half the young black men are under the supervision of the criminal justice system (i.e. in prison, on probation or on parole) on any given day, thereby preventing them from getting good jobs and developing healthy family relationships. * Pilot programs that provide for treatment as an alternative to prosecution should also be funded. This should especially be encouraged in the cases involving pregnant women. More than 20 states have prosecuted women who use illicit drugs during pregnancy for drug distribution. This practice is discouraging women from seeking prenatal care and treatment. President Clinton or his drug czar should speak out against such prosecutions and provide funds that would divert such people from the criminal justice system into the public health system. * Pilot programs for prison-based treatment projects. Just as the federal penitentiaries have had problems in providing treatment, so have state prisons and jails. Funding should be provided to encourage treatment and rehabilitation programs in state institutions. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 17 Summary: Developing Public Health Strategies 1. Make Treatment on Demand a Reality * Shift the federal budget emphasis from law enforcement to treatment and health services * Include treatment in the national health care plan * Encourage use of methadone and development of other maintenance drugs * Tie arrests for drug offenses to treatment and rehabilitation, instead of prosecutions * Make treatment and rehabilitation available in prisons 2. Make AIDS Prevention and Treatment a Top Drug Policy Priority * Remove legal barriers to the purchase and possession of injection equipment * Announce support of all AIDS prevention efforts including needle exchange programs * Clarify federal law so research on the effectiveness of needle exchanges can be adequately funded 3. Provide Health Services to Drug Users * Focus on AIDS prevention and treatment * Focus on preventing the spread of tuberculosis, particularly in prisons * Focus on prenatal care to pregnant women using drugs 4. Get the Police out of Medical Practice * Recognize the medical use of marijuana. DEA should reschedule marijuana to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act, HHS should re-open the compassionate Investigational New Drug program * DEA should de-emphasize prosecution of doctors for their medical practices * HHS should encourage research on Schedule I drugs for their medical purposes, particularly MDMA in psychotherapy and heroin in treatment of pain 18 The Drug Policy Foundation Developing Public Health Strategies President Bill Clinton should move away from a drug strategy dominated by law enforcement towards a strategy dominated by public health. The new administration should focus on two priorities, both of which President-elect Clinton pledged to support during the presidential campaign: * Make treatment on demand a reality. * Make AIDS a top health concern of drug control policies. Make Treatment on Demand a Reality Fulfilling these campaign promises requires reallocating the drug control budget, emphasizing health-based solutions to drug abuse. President Clinton must include substance abuse treatment as part of the national health care plan, making treatment as available to the uninsured poor as it is now for those with adequate health insurance. Treatment should be defined broadly to include not only programs of abstinence, but also the use of maintenance drugs, availability of clean needles and the availability of basic health services, particularly those to prevent the spread of AIDS and tuberculosis. Financial support should be given to outpatient as well as inpatient programs. The United States should also emphasize voluntary, user-friendly treatment, as opposed to coercive treatment. While coercive treatment - particularly civil commitment of drug users - has a history of failure, there is room in our criminal justice system for ties to treatment programs. For example, people arrested, but not yet convicted, of drug offenses should be given the choice of treatment instead of incarceration. Unfortunately, this seemingly compassionate approach does have great potential for misuse. Arrestees choosing treatment are easy prey for coerced treatment, a greater punishment than incarceration. In addition, not everyone arrested for drug offenses needs treatment. The second area where treatment can be tied to the criminal justice system is in prisons. Currently treatment and rehabilitation programs in both state and federal prisons are not as widely available as they need to be, according to recent GAO reports.(19) Offenders need to be given the opportunity Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 19 to be successful upon their release. They need to be rewarded with early release for successfully completing rehabilitation programs. Treatment options have narrowed in the last decade. While abstinence programs have continued, new limitations have been placed on methadone maintenance. At a time when heroin use is expanding, methadone programs should be expanding rather than contracting. There is strong evidence that availability of methadone reduces crime by addicts.(20) Thus, in addition to being a sensible drug policy, methadone maintenance is a sensible crime control policy. Other maintenance drugs should be researched and used in addition to methadone. If the only acceptable treatment program is an abstinence one, then treatment will surely fail. This narrow interpretation of treatment would be the equivalent of a doctor prescribing the same drug to all of his patients. Addicts are individuals who need a whole range of options. The Bush administration has opposed providing sterile syringes to injecting drug users at a time when HIV is spreading rapidly through the injecting drug using community. Refusal to consider needle exchanges has been part of the zero-tolerance demonization of drug users by federal political leaders. We need to move from harsh demonization to inclusive humanization of drug users so that they can become productive members of society. Developing a plan for treatment on demand is an essential first step. Mr. Clinton has advocated providing college loans in return for community service. This should include providing medical school training, as well as training in other health fields, in return for working to provide health services to drug users. Similarly, as the Department of Defense shrinks, personnel trained in providing health services should be redeployed in health departments to provide health care to drug users. This is particularly true today when the health care emergencies of AIDS and tuberculosis are spreading through the United States spurred by drug use. Shift Budget Emphasis from Law Enforcement to Health-Based Solutions President Bush and the drug czar talked about fighting the drug war on all fronts, but the proportions of the drug budget pie tell a different story: two-thirds for supply reduction and one-third for demand reduction.(2l) What used to be a 50-50 split between compassion and punishment (before 1981) was transformed into a windfall for the enforcement agencies and starvation for treatment, prevention and education programs. During the Bush administration, the federal government spent $30.5 billion on drug law enforcement out of a total budget of $45.2 billion.(22) The Drug Enforcement Administration nearly quadrupled its size since the beginning of the Reagan era. The DEA budget increased from $216 million in 1981 to $817 million for 1993. The more the drug war failed, the more funding the DEA received. 20 The Drug Policy Foundation Moving to treatment on demand and away from arrests and incarceration will be a budget saver. The cost of arrest and incarceration is enormous - with estimates for holding an inmate in jail at an average per-bed cost of $50,000 per year.(23) That much money could provide one year of treatment and rehabilitation to dozens of people. Arrest and incarceration turn citizens into the unemployed and underemployed, whereas providing treatment, education and job training will develop productive citizens. The budget for fiscal year 1993 provides only $1.05 billion for treatment services to the states, while the budget for the least successful drug control program - interdiction efforts (including Coast Guard, Customs Service, Defense Department, State Department and DEA) - is $3.1 billion.(24) (See pages 24-28.) Thus, we spend an average of $150 million per country in the Andean region to try to prevent cocaine from coming into the United States, while spending an average of only $20 million per state to help addicts get treatment - a seven-fold disparity. Moving away from the law enforcement model will save money both in the short and long terms. A federal government grants program to aid state drug treatment initiatives already exists, but it is woefully underfunded. An average of $20 million is budgeted for each state, with funds distributed based on a population-related formula rather than on the relative needs of the states or any programs they are initiating. Also, many of the federal grants depend on state contributions, and if the states - many of which are in fiscal crisis - are unable to put up their share, little of the federal money is delivered. A first step to making treatment on demand a reality, especially in the hardest-hit communities, is to initiate a thorough nationwide review of drug treatment availability and the needs of each state. Reducing reliance on forced treatment and allowing volunteers to join programs first would also be a sensible early step. Once the review is completed, the Clinton administration should determine how much it is willing to increase federal subsidies for drug treatment services. The new president should then make his proposal to the Congress and ensure that it is quickly implemented, so results are visible before the end of the first presidential term. Make AIDS the Top Priority in Drug Control - Support Needle Exchanges and Medical Marijuana The Bush administration placed the unreachable goal of a "drug-free America" above pragmatic policies to prevent and treat AIDS. This view was summed up by drug czar Bob Martinez in a July 1992 report on needle exchanges where he said: "We [cannot] allow our concern for AIDS to undermine our determination to win the war on drugs." This view - and the resulting inaction - has allowed the uncontrolled spread of a deadly epidemic. The Centers for Disease Control reports that Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 21 IV Drug Use a Factor in 1 of 3 AIDS Cases Figure 6, (24.1) one-third of all newly diagnosed AIDS cases in the United States each year are related to intravenous drug use. (24.1) During the presidential campaign, Governor Bill Clinton endorsed the recommendations of the National Commission on AIDS. In July 1991, the commission issued a report, "The Twin Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV," which recommended: We must take immediate steps to curb the current spread of HIV infection among those who cannot get treatment or who cannot stop taking drugs. Outreach programs which operate needle exchanges and distribute bleach not only help to control the spread of HIV, but also refer many individuals to treatment programs. Legal sanctions on injection equipment do not reduce illicit drug use, but they do increase the sharing of injection equipment and hence the spread of HIV infection. The AIDS commission concluded: "Any program which does not deal with the duality of the HIV/drug epidemic is destined to fail." The Commission urged the federal government to move away from a law enforcement approach to controlling drugs toward a public health approach that to date has "been seriously neglected." Thus, making AIDS prevention a top priority is consistent with moving toward a public health drug control strategy. Since the Commission report, the most controversial aspect of AIDS prevention among drug users - needle exchanges - has become accepted by local and state governments, public policy advisory commissions and private organizations concerned about AIDS. Among the public officials who have come to support needle exchanges are: New York City Mayor David Dinkins, New Haven Mayor John Daniels, Hartford Mayor Carrie Saxon Perry, District of Columbia Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and Baltimore Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke. In addition, Hawaii and Connecticut have passed laws authorizing needle exchanges. The California legislature passed a needle exchange bill in 1992, but drug czar Martinez pressured Governor Pete Wilson into vetoing the bill. The momentum is clearly in favor 22 The Drug Policy Foundation of needle exchanges, allowing President Clinton to fulfill his campaign pledge and implement the recommendations of the National Commission on AIDS Just as AIDS prevention took a back seat to "zero tolerance," so has AIDS care. When evidence began to develop that marijuana was a useful medicine for people with AIDS, the Public Health Service, under the direction of James O. Mason, summarily closed the compassionate Investigational New Drug (IND) program, which for 15 years allowed a small number of patients access to a legal supply of medical marijuana. Even though the program was in existence since 1976, Dr. Mason recommended the program be closed without holding any public hearings or even allowing a public comment period. At the time, the FDA was receiving hundreds of IND applications, primarily from doctors treating AIDS patients, for medical marijuana. While civil servants working in the IND program were expressing sympathy for such patients and approving INDs, political appointees of the Bush administration put the drug war first and denied care to these patients. DEA Administrator Robert Bonner has been as obstinate as Dr. Mason. In a caustic and inhumane ruling in the Federal Register, Mr. Bonner rejected the therapeutic value of marijuana, ignoring the advice of the chief administrative law judge of the DEA.(25) The Drug Policy Foundation, in concert with many doctors and patients, is suing the DEA to move marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II, thereby allowing doctors to prescribe marijuana. Schedule II, which includes substances like cocaine, carries severe enough restrictions so that diversion is not an issue. It is ironic that marijuana, which most people recognize as a lesser drug than cocaine, is considered so dangerous by the DEA that it cannot trust doctors to prescribe it legitimately. The Clinton administration can take steps to resolve the medical marijuana issue by doing two simple things: (1) appoint an assistant secretary of health who will listen to the civil servants of the FDA and re-open the compassionate IND program; and (2) appoint a DEA administrator who will follow the advice of its chief administrative law judge, Francis L. Young, and reschedule marijuana to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. These two steps will require no change in law and will make it possible for AIDS patients, and others suffering from serious life-and-sense-threatening illness to acquire marijuana for their treatment. Related to the medical marijuana issue is the more general question of the role of drug enforcement officials in the practice of medicine. Pressure from police officials has resulted in bans on the medical use of MDMA in psychotherapy, no progress on the medical use of heroin to treat pain and prosecution of doctors for their practice of medicine. As part of the move to a public health strategy of drug control, the police need to be taken out of the business of controlling medical practice and research. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 23 Summary: De-militarizing the Drug War Abroad * End the experiment of using the Defense Department in drug enforcement and de-militarize the international drug war * Do not make the drug war a higher priority than stopping abuses of human rights * Reverse anti-drug funding priorities in Latin America; recognize that demand reduction at home and economic development abroad are more effective * Stop pressuring Latin American countries to adopt the U.S. drug war * Stop ignoring international law and the sovereignty of nations 24 The Drug Policy Foundation De-militarizing the Drug War Abroad The U.S. war on drugs is a bad export. Fighting the drug war south of the border has led to a dangerous deterioration in inter-American affairs and no decrease in the flow of drugs. During the last decade, the United States has emphasized a militaristic drug war abroad, where U.S. troops were sent to the Andean region, DEA operatives acted like military troops and the U.S. forced Latin American countries to use their military against their own people. The latest government reports show that drug production and importation are on the rise. Thus, not only are we pursuing a failed drug strategy, but we also are discouraging the development of democratic and sovereign nations. Eradication and Interdiction Have Failed The history of drug control efforts demonstrates that cutting off the flow of drugs from one source gives rise to another source. For this reason eradication, interdiction and crop substitution programs have never been successful. Among examples of such failure in current drug war history are: * In the early-1970s, President Nixon focused on poppy cultivation in Turkey. He succeeded in diminishing the Turkish poppy crop, but Mexico became a major supplier, by 1974 its share of the expanded heroin market jumped from 38 percent to 77 percent. * During the Carter administration when herbicides were sprayed on marijuana and poppies growing in Mexico, the marijuana crop moved to Colombia and the United States while the poppy crops moved to the Golden Triangle (a section of Southeast Asia that includes Burma, Laos and Thailand). Supply and use of both drugs increased. * During the Reagan administration when Vice President Bush headed the South Florida Task Force, interdiction of drugs coming into Florida was militarized. This resulted in the cocaine trade spreading from South Florida to the Gulf Coast, West Coast and Northeast. * During the Bush administration the focus was on the Andean strategy, which attempted to destroy coca in Latin America. However, according to Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 25 Drug Production Increased, 1988-1991 Cocaine Hydrochloride Opium Marijuana 1988 348-454 mt* 2,433-3,308 mt 12,130-16,710 mt 1989 845-1,050 mt 3,405-4,988 mt 49,281-51,281 mt** 1990 880-1,090 mt 3,432-3,872 mt 26,100-28,100 mt 1991 955-1,170 mt 3,552 (mean) mt 13,580-15,580 mt * Metric tons. Since 1988, production figures have included multiple harvests from "mature" coca plants. ** In 1989, the U.S. government raised its estimate of Mexico's marijuana crop by a factor of 10. This figure has decreased since, reflecting either increased crop eradication or an initial overestimate. Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, The NNICC Report 1991 (July 1992), pp. 15, 29 & 47, and The NNICC Report 1989 (June 1990), pp. 13, 38, 46, 49 & 55-56. the State Department, coca leaf production increased from 293,700 metric tons in 1988 to 337,100 metric tons in 1992. This history of failure should be enough to convince policy-makers that destroying drugs at their source and attempting to seize drugs before they cross U.S. borders is a strategy doomed to failure. It is time for us to enter into a partnership with the source countries in this hemisphere. For example, what the Andean region wants from us is economic assistance, not anti-drug assistance. Just as the root causes of drug trafficking in the United States are economic and social so are the roots of drug trafficking abroad. Rather than focusing on symptoms, the Clinton administration should focus on the economic problems that foster the rise of drug production and trafficking in producing countries. Human Rights and International Law Have Deteriorated Not only has the United States continued to pursue an obviously failed strategy, it also has been willing to ignore widespread human rights violations in source countries and ignore international law. In the end, the United States will have failed to control drugs and encouraged the development of undemocratic governments that abuse the rights of their citizens. The failure of the international drug war has resulted in desperate actions by the United States including the kidnapping of foreign nationals and even the invasion of one country in order to arrest suspected drug criminals. Extradition treaties, territorial integrity and international law are no longer hurdles that stand in the way of drug enforcement. The United States has sacrificed any credibility it has in spreading democracy in Latin America by making the pursuit of the drug war a higher priority than spreading democracy and human rights. We have been willing to provide massive military assistance to countries with a history of human 26 The Drug Policy Foundation rights abuses and anti-democratic governments. For example, after Alberto Fujimori ended democratic rule in Peru, the DEA continued to operate there. The DEA operations remain active to this day, placing the United States on the side of a dictator. Similarly, the United States is funding the Colombian military with hundreds of millions of dollars - whose human rights violations are well known. DOD Drug-Fighting Budget Figure 7, (26) The United States Wastes Billions on the International Drug War In the international war on drugs, the United States gets the least bang for its anti-drug buck. Our country spends hundreds of millions of dollars to operate AWACS planes, Black Hawk attack helicopters and other fancy pieces of hardware, but nets precious few drugs. The Department of Defense drug war budget went from zero in 1981 to $901 million in 1992.(26) As can be seen from the increased availability of drugs, their increased potency and decreased prices, our experiment with Defense leadership in drug control has been a failure. It is an experiment that should no longer be pursued. Critics of the U.S. anti-drug strategy abroad, including the respected Center for Defense Information, accuse the Defense Department of using the drug war as a means of maintaining its bloated budget. President Clinton must use a firm hand to rein in the free-spending Defense hawks, especially when the public clearly wants the government to spend more time on pressing domestic matters. Not only has the Defense Department increased its funding of the international drug war, so have all other federal agencies fighting the drug war. The DEA international budget has increased from $31 million in 1981 to $530.1 million in 1993; the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Matters increased from $34.7 million in 1981 to $173 million in 1993. Overall the interdiction budget for the eight agencies involved in that effort increased from $349.7 million in 1981 to $2.2 billion in 1993. Choose Health, Not War: Drug Policy in Transition 27 The Drug Policy Foundation makes the following recommendations: * End the experiment of using the Defense Department in drug enforcement and de-militarize the international drug war. The Defense Department's role in law enforcement has become an expensive failure. The Clinton administration should order home all Defense personnel and other quasi-military operatives of other U.S. agencies fighting the drug war. * Do not make the drug war a higher priority than stopping abuses of human rights. The practice of providing aid in spite of ongoing human rights violations only encourages such abuses and involves the United States in activities inconsistent with its policy of encouraging human rights and democracy. * Reverse anti-drug funding priorities in Latin America. Current funding heavily favors military and law enforcement assistance rather than economic development. Future funding should focus on the root causes of drug trafficking - economic and social injustice. * Stop pressuring Latin American countries to adopt the U.S. drug war. In particular, the so-called "certification standard" requiring compliance with all U.S. drug initiatives for economic aid should be abolished. Andean nations should not be forced to use their militaries against their citizens. * Stop ignoring international law and the sovereignty of nations. The Clinton administration should announce that it will no longer allow U.S. drug enforcement agents to kidnap foreign nationals to force them to stand trial in the United States. Similarly, the United States should not invade a country in order to arrest its leader on drug charges. Instead, the U.S. should rely on extradition treaties. 28 The Drug Policy Foundation Endnotes 1. Increased incarcerations have not led to a decrease in crime. Crimes Prisoners (state+federal) Rates/ Rates/ Totals 100,000 Totals 100,000 1972 8,248,800 3,961 196,092 93 1973 8,718,100 4,154 204,211 96 1974 10,253,400 4,850 218,466 102 1975 11,292,400 5,299 240,593 111 1976 11,349,700 5,287 262,833 120 1977 10,984,500 5,078 278,141 126 1978 11,209,000 5,140 294,396 132 1979 12,249,500 5,566 301,470 133 1980 13,408,300 5,950 315,974 138 1981 13,423,800 5,858 353,167 153 1982 12,974,400 5,604 394,374 170 1983 12,108,600 5,175 419,820 179 1984 11,881,800 5,031 443,398 188 1985 12,431,400 5,207 480,568 200 1986 13,211,900 5,480 522,084 216 1987 13,508,700 5,550 560,812 228 1988 13,923,100 5,664 603,732 244 1989 14,251,400 5,741 680,907 271 1990 14,475,600 5,820 738,894 292 1991 14,872,900 5,898 Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States: 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 58; and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics: 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 636. 2. More spending has not slowed the killing. Federal Drug Budget Total Murders 1981 $1.464 billion 22,520 1982 $1.652 21,010 1983 $1.935 19,310 1984 $2.298 18,690 1985 $2.68 18,980 1986 $2.826 20,610 1987 $4.787 20,100 1988 $4.702 20,680 1989 $6.592 21,500 1990 $9.693 23,440 1991 $10.841 24,700 1992* $11.953 1993** $12.729 *estimate **requested Sources: Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, January 1992, p. 214; and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States: 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 58. 3. The Bush Drug War Record, The Drug Policy Foundation, Sept. 5,1992 4. States and localities spent $19.1 billion on corrections in 1988, or 31 percent of the total 60.9 billion they spent on criminal justice that year. The total spent in 1990 was 64.3 billion, of which 31 percent is $19.9 billion, providing the estimated $20 billion figure. Figures for 1991 and 1992 are expected to be higher. U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, BJS National Update, January 1992 and July 1992 editions, p. 2 and p. 4 respectively. 5. M.L. Rosenberg, P.W. O'Carroll, KE. Powell, "Let's Be Clear: Violence is a Public Health Problem," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol . 267, No. 22, pp. 3071-3072, June 10, 1992. 6. Denise Baker, "Panelists Tackle Dilemmas Confronting the Human Side of Cities," Nation's Cities Weekly, Dec. 7,1992, p. 6. 7. This finding is consistent with votes in San Francisco in November 1991 and Santa Cruz in November 1992 on the medical marijuana issue which found 78 percent of voters supporting marijuana's medical use. 8. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Against Excess, Basic Books, 1992; Mathea Falco, The Making of a Drug-Free America, Times Books, 1992, Peter Reuter, "Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American Drug Policy," Daedalus, Summer 1992; P.A. O'Hare, R. Newcombe, A. Matthews, E.C. Buning and E. Drucker, eds., The Reduction of Drug-Related Harm, Routledge, 1992; Arnold S. Trebach and Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations, The Drug Policy Foundation, 1990. 9. Marc Mauer, "Americans Behind Bars: One Year Later," The Sentencing Project, 1990. 10. Special Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, U.S. Sentencing Commission, August 1991. 11. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844 12. Because of mandatory minimums, the time served for violent offenses is almost the same as the time served for drug offenses, which are non-violent. Average Length of Prison Sentences Violent Offenses Drug Offenses 1985 135.4months 58.2months 1986 132 62.2 1987 126.2 67.8 1988 110.7 71.3 1989 90.6 74.9 1990 89.8 81.2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics: 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 506. 13. Drug Policy Foundation v. Martinez, formerly Drug Policy Foundation v. Bennett, No. 90-2278 FMS (Northern District of California) 14. This idea was suggested by Vernon E. Jordan Jr. in Al Kamen et al., "Clinton May Relocate the 'Drug Czar,'" Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1992, p. A21. 15. Ronald J. Ostrow, "Barr Urges Closing of Drug Control Office," Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 1992, p. 34. 16. ONDCP Budget 1989 $3.5 Million 1990 $37.0 1991 $104.3 1992 $126.7 Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, January 1992, pp. 212-214. 16.1. Carolyn Skorneck, "Martinez-Campaign Funds," Associated Press, Jan. 9,1992. 17. DEA Budget Authority 1981 $216million 1982 $239 1983 $255 1984 $292 1985 $344 1986 $372 1987 $486 1988 $493 1989 $543 1990 $558 1991 $692 1992* $720 1993** $819 *estimate **requested Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, January 1992, pp. 212-214. 18. Drug Enforcement Top Priority for FBI under Sessions,~ Drug Law Report, Vol . 1, No. 30, November/ December 1987, p. 359, Kevin Zeese, editor. 19. Drug Treatment: Despite New Strategy, Few Federal Inmates Receive Treatment," General Accounting Office, September 1991; "Drug Treatment: State Prisons Face Challenges in Providing Services," General Accounting Office, September 1991. 20. Studies of six methadone programs in Baltimore, New York and Philadelphia in 1986 found that addicts in treatment longer than six months reported committing crimes an average of 24 days a year, compared with 307 days a year when addicted to heroin. In addition, methadone patients are more frequently employed and pursuing education than are heroin addicts. Falco, The Making of a Drug-Free America, pp. 126-127 (1992). See also, the Effectiveness of Drug Abuse Treatment: Implications for Controlling AIDS/HIV Infection," Background Paper No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, September 1990) pp. 67-77. 21. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, January 1992. 22. The Bush Drug War Record, The Drug Policy Foundation, Sept. 5, 1992. 23. Projections for U.S. Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice, July 15, 1991. 24. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, January 1992. 24.1. Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, January 1990, January 1992, p. 9. 25. Currently the Drug Policy Foundation, the Physicians Association for AIDS Care, the National Lymphoma Foundation, the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics and the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws have litigation pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit challenging Mr. Bonner's decision. DPF v. DEA, No. 92-1179 (D.C. Cir.); ACT u. DEA, No. 92-1168, D.C. Cir.). The parties would be willing to withdraw this litigation if DEA agreed to reschedule marijuana. 26. DOD Drug Enforcement Budget 1981 $0 million 1982 $4.2 1983 $9.7 1984 $14.6 1985 $54.8 1986 $105.7 1987 $405.3 1988 $94.7 1989 $329.1 1990 $534.4 1991 $751.0 1992 $901.O 1993 $889.6 Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, January 1992, pp. 212-214.